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Abstract—The problem of malware has become significant
on Android devices. Library operating systems and application
virtualization are both possible solutions for confining malware.
Unfortunately, such solutions do not exist for Android. Designing
mechanisms for application virtualization is a significant chal-
lenge for several reasons: (1) graphics performance is important
due to popularity of games and (2) applications with the same
UID can share state. This paper presents Anception, the first
flexible application virtualization framework for Android. It is
implemented as a modification to the Android kernel and sup-
ports application virtualization that addresses the above require-
ments. Anception is able to confine many types of malware while
supporting unmodified Android applications. Our Anception-
based system exhibits up to 3.9% overhead on various 2D/3D
benchmarks, and 1.8% overhead on the SunSpider benchmark.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones have become an attractive target for malware.
The number of malicious Android apps is growing rapidly
and has reached 700,000+ according to a recent estimate [30].
Rootkits are a particularly serious threat since they can com-
pletely subvert the system.
One promising approach to limit the effectiveness of mal-
ware is to use virtualization to help confine malware. One
implementation of virtualization on Android is the Cells [1]
system. Cells allows a single Android device to be used as two
or more virtual devices, called “virtual phones”. The user can
switch between the virtual phones using a preconfigured user
interface gesture. It provides a high-performance approach
to support virtual phones. It does not address the problem
of isolating a malware application and a sensitive banking
application on the same phone. Note that in Cells, each virtual
phone is a full Android environment, with its own capabilities
to download and install applications and, possibly, its own
phone number.
Another possible approach to confine malware is the notion
of application sandboxing by using a library operating sys-
tem (OS). Drawbridge [25] is one such system designed for
Windows. As far as we are aware, such a library for Android
does not currently exist and porting Drawbridge to Android
will, most likely, be a significant challenge due to the vast
architectural differences between Windows and Android. More
importantly, there are three fundamental drawbacks to using a
Drawbridge-like solution on Android. First, Drawbridge uses
RDP, Windows Remote Desktop Protocol, for virtualized ap-
plications to render graphics on the host system. This approach
is likely to be impractical on Android devices because many
popular applications, especially games, are graphics intensive.
It will also impact the display’s responsiveness to user input.
Second, Drawbridge does not support shared state between
applications. Each application is a sandboxed process and shar-
ing state (e.g., files) among processes remains an unresolved
problem. Android permits such sharing among applications
with the same UID. The UID of an application, in Android,
distinguishes the origin of the application, e.g., the vendor and
the associated package to which the application belongs.
Finally, Drawbridge does not support multiple processes
bound to a single OS library. This is a significant limitation.
Fork/clone need to be supported on Android.
This paper describes a novel virtualization approach, called
Anception, that provides flexible application virtualization on
Android, addressing the drawbacks of previous approaches.
Anception provides the following features:
• A notion of containers that provide a lightweight virtu-
alized OS to applications.
• Efficient graphics (close to native speed), with native
graphics acceleration capabilities, to all applications.
• Support for binding multiple applications to the same
container so that they can share filesystem state, file
handles, etc. Furthermore, each container can support
multiple processes. Fork/clone are supported.
Anception permits sharing among applications under an ap-
propriate policy. A reasonable policy for the use of Anception
is to only allow applications with the same UID to share the
container. This would be consistent with the Android security
model and would prevent a banking application, provided by
a bank, from being in the same security container as a gaming
application, provided by an unverified developer. At the same
time, the policy would permit the bank app to co-operate with
other trusted applications (possibly by the same developer) that
share a common persistent state on the file system. With the
above policy, Anception does not change the current Android
experience.
Anception’s design also provides higher resiliency to a
sensitive app from a buggy and possibly malicious app when
they are assigned to the same container. A scenario is where
a bank provides two apps that share a package name or a
shared uid field. One of the apps is for online banking and
another is a financial analysis package that may access a
common local database between the two apps for calculating
balances, plotting trends, etc. The online banking application
needs access to the user’s online banking password and is very
carefully designed to only keep the password in memory for
the minimum time and always send it encrypted to a remote
system. The financial analysis app on the other hand, is not
as carefully designed and provides an exploit path so that
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it can be used by an attacker to acquire elevated privileges
on the container. For this scenario it would normally be
difficult for the banking app to protect its secrets from the
financial calculator and yet be in the same container to share
system state. Anception’s memory isolation design allows the
banking app to better safeguard the secrets in memory from
the compromised financial analysis app.
The key contributions of this paper include:
1) An application virtualization mechanism for the Android
kernel that provides good performance for graphics-
intensive workloads and allows applications in the same
virtual machine to share filesystem state. The solution
does not require any changes to existing Android appli-
cations
2) Memory isolation among processes in the same con-
tainer, as provided by our application virtualization
mechanism. This guarantee is upheld even when the
container is compromised.
3) An efficient system call interposition method to transfer
system calls to an application’s virtual machine
To provide the above contributions, Anception uses a novel
form of virtualization which we call headless virtualization.
With this form of virtualization, security containers for ap-
plications are implemented as headless virtual machines, i.e.,
they do not have the user interface inside the virtual machine;
instead the user interface continues to reside on the host,
providing close-to-native graphics performance. In Anception,
a virtualized application launches from the host but relies on
its container to service most of the system calls. This reduces
the attack surface available to the application to compromise
the system.
Anception is an x86-based prototype, consisting of approx-
imately 5500 lines of code. It requires minimal changes to the
Android kernel. Most of the code resides in two Linux kernel
modules, one for the host system and one for implementing the
containers using guest virtual machines. We created a headless
Android userspace stack for the guest virtual machines.
We evaluated an Anception-based system with respect
to both security and performance. We analyzed previously
reported vulnerabilities in Android and found that Ancep-
tion provides comparable protection to solutions based on
full virtualization. With respect to performance, we analyzed
Anception using on several popular benchmarks. Anception
incurs a 1.2% overhead on the SunSpider benchmark and less
than 3.9% overhead on a variety of PassMark 2D and 3D
graphics benchmarks. Power consumption overheads of the
Passmark benchmark running within an Anception container
was 2.4%. Because of the headless design, Anception contain-
ers are memory efficient. They can be launched with 44MB
of memory assigned to them versus the 55MB for Cells [1].
Rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section II we
present the threat model for Anception based systems. Section
III presents the high level overview of the Anception model
and Section IV presents the design and implementation details.
In section V we present a security evaluation of our model
and in section VI discuss the performance overheads. Section
VII discusses the limitations of our approach. We present the
related work in section VIII and conclude in section IX.
II. ANCEPTION THREAT MODEL
Our current implementation assumes that the base set of
applications that are preinstalled on an Android device, e.g.,
Photo Gallery and Contacts Manager, can be trusted. In prin-
ciple, they could all be encapsulated in Anception containers
for additional security, but our current implementation does
not do that.
We assume that the host operating system kernel is trusted
and cannot be compromised by a virtualized untrusted app.
Except for display (and touch) management services, we
provide virtualized equivalents of various privileged Android
services (e.g. LocationManagerService, vold) that execute in
a container. Untrusted apps may attempt to exploit them to
acquire elevated privileges. We assume that a malicious app
may completely compromise its container.
We assume that apps may attempt to open /dev devices
and issue I/O control operations on them in an effort to exploit
bugs in the kernel.
Anception assumes that an application is capable of acting
in malicious ways. For example, it can simply ask for more
permissions than needed and use them to exfiltrate user data.
An application can also execute native code on the device
including system calls allowed by the operating system secu-
rity policy (which is usually most system calls). This often
takes the form of local privilege escalation attacks that exploit
a vulnerability in some privileged component or framework
code.
Finally, our threat model also includes combinations of
these techniques wherein a benign application may download
an exploit and execute it to gain elevated privileges. It then
proceeds to install backdoors and steal user data. However,
we cannot protect against all types of privilege escalations.
Exploits that involve direct exploitation of a kernel interface
are outside the scope of our threat model.
Covert channels are also outside the scope of this paper.
Hardware devices are ultimately shared among all contain-
ers. Low-level exploits on the device drivers in the host are
outside the threat model. Blocking access to devices, e.g.,
sensors, selectively for containers is possible future work,
based on prior work in the area [4], [22], [33].
III. OVERVIEW OF APPROACH
The Anception model strengthens isolation between groups
of smartphone applications and between applications and the
host OS by providing a notion of containers (see Figure 1).
Containers in Anception are implemented by using lguest[26],
a lightweight type II hypervisor. Containers provide resilience
against malware that execute privilege escalation attacks.
Those attacks, in most cases, are restricted to their container.
Containers also provide resource isolation. Apps in different
containers do not share filesystem state.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between apps and contain-
ers. A container may be associated with one or more apps. A
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reasonable system policy is to associate apps sharing a UID
with the same container. In Android, apps with the same UID
have the same rights and can share filesystem state. We assume
this policy. Figure 1 shows three user apps. App X is bound
to container A and apps Y and Z are both bound to container
B. App X can exchange data within the device with app Y
and Z via IPC. Apps Y and Z can share system state such as
files with each other and thus have additional sharing channels
since they are in the same container.
A downloaded app is bound to a container. The container
maintains persistent state of that app. This primarily includes
the filesystem state. It also includes the kernel state associated
with the app, e.g,. state of open files, open network or IPC
sockets.
A pre-installed app that comes with the phone need not be
bound to a container. As indicated in Section II, we trust pre-
installed apps not to be malicious. If additional resilience is
desired, pre-installed apps could be put in a container.
IPC messages between apps, even across container bound-
aries, are allowed to maintain compatibility with the Android
sharing model. In Android, apps can send requests to each
other via intents, which are implemented using ioctl calls
on /dev/binder. The system then delivers IPC messages
to the recipient(s), subject to access control rules. Recipients
can choose to accept or reject the requests. This allows apps
to cooperate with each other. For example, Snapchat app can
request the Photo Gallery to take a photo. Then, it can request
the Facebook app to upload the photo to a user’s Facebook
page. Allowing these IPCs is crucial to the Android model.
Providing fast graphics for virtualized apps is generally
considered difficult. To allow virtualized apps to get close to
native graphics performance, we chose to virtualize an app
partially. The app launches normally in the host. Its memory
pages reside on the host. User-space instructions execute on
the host. Most system calls, including most ioctls, are
directed to the app’s container. They are executed by an app’s
proxy process in the container. This provides fast display
updates and interactive performance at a potential expense
of slower filesystem calls. An alternative design would have
been to do the graphics operations in the container and use
a remote windowing protocol such as X windows, VNC, or
RDP. In that case, filesystem operations would be fast but
graphics operations would be slower. We provide experimental
data in the section on Evaluation that supports our thesis that
optimizing user-interface performance is more important than
filesystem performance for most apps.
The above design constraint for speeding up graphics im-
plies that all apps must launch from the host. An alternative
design is to launch the app from the container but that would
have slowed down the performance of ioctls, which are
used for sending intents and display-related requests. Those
ioctls would have to go back to the host for sending to apps
in other containers or for updating the display. That would
imply a big context switch from the container’s VM to the
host. We avoid most of these context switches by launching
the apps from the host. As Section V substantiates, ioctls
are very frequent on Android as compared to other system
calls
Given that apps launch from the host, the virtual memory
pages of apps reside on the host. But most system calls,
e.g., file writes, are carried out on its container’s kernel.
This implies that a container’s kernel cannot directly inspect
the memory pages of an app that uses it. Conceptually, the
container is like a server to the app and manages its system
state. This provides an additional layer of protection to apps.
We described a scenario in the Introduction where a banking
app and a financial analysis app need to be in the same
container. As long as the banking app does not write the user’s
password to the disk or send it unencrypted over the network,
the financial analysis app cannot get to it, even if it is a rootkit.
The financial analysis app may be able to totally subvert the
shared container, but the container does not have the ability
to inspect the banking app’s virtual memory. The container
could attempt to core dump the app, but that would cause the
host operating system to be the one to dump code. That will
be written to the host OS. The container could also attempt to
return bad data in system calls to try to do Iago attacks [7]. We
are not able to prevent those; the banking app must be designed
to be resilient to those attacks. Any critical certificates or keys
used by the app must also be part of its code (which are stored
on the host side) so that they cannot be tampered with by the
container.
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Fig. 1. Model Overview
An app should only be able to write to its container. But, it is
acceptable for it to read the read-only part of the file system
from the host. The following principle is used for directing
VFS (virtual file system) layer operations for disk files:
• Access to read-only parts of the file system, e.g.,
/system, application code, and system libraries, are
directed to the host
• Others are directed to the container.
The above principle is important to protect the banking app
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from the malicious financial analysis app when they are in the
same container. If the code or system libraries were read from
the container’s filesystem, the malicious app could modify
them and corrupt the banking app.
The device filesystem provides access to various hardware
or virtual devices. Some examples are the framebuffer, the
accelerometer and Binder. On an Android system, all hardware
devices are managed by the system. Thus no app should
be able to directly communicate with the device files for
these devices. So we just forward these requests to virtual
devices in the container. The two exceptions to this policy are
/dev/binder and /dev/ashmem. Access to these devices
is needed by apps to support IPCs and shared memory. Access
to these is directed to the host.
In Anception, each container has instances of standard
Android system services. For example, one of the standard
system services provides access to the contacts database. An
app in a container should use the container’s contacts database.
These services are invoked via IPCs. This implies that such
IPCs directed at system services, must be redirected to the
container.
One exception to the redirection of IPCs to system services
is the Notification Manager service that notifies users of
notifications from apps. Since user-interface is provided by the
host, any IPCs to the Notification Manager must be delivered
to the host, rather than to the container.
In Anception, all apps are always installed on the trusted
host and launched from there, even though apps are bound
to their respective containers. That implies IPCs between two
apps that are bound to the same container must be delivered
via the host, i.e., such IPCs must not be redirected to the
container.
IV. ANCEPTION IMPLEMENTATION
Our prototype consists of two Linux kernel modules (one
host, one guest), a few userspace helpers, and a headless
Android userspace stack. We use the 2.6.39 x86 Asus EEEPC
kernel, Android 2.3 Gingerbread for x86 and an Asus EEEPC
ET1602 tablet for the prototype. The implementation is a little
over 5500 lines of code. Our changes are minimal and only
add a few lines of code to the system call handler, the process
descriptor and the fork system call (approximately 30 lines
in total). The rest of the code is within kernel modules. The
lguest hypervisor is approximately 6000 lines of code. Below,
we describe the design of the system.
Figure 2 shows the high-level architecture for implementing
Anception containers and Figure 3 shows further details.
Each Anception container corresponds to a minimalistic guest
virtual machine to provide isolation properties. Apps launch
in the trusted system but system calls that could potentially
break the isolation properties on Android are intercepted and
redirected to the guest virtual machine. On our Android-based
implementation, this includes all file-system related calls and
most ioctl calls depending upon the level of sharing we
wish to configure.
As stated in the previous section, all the user-interface
aspects of the app remain in the trusted host system for all
the containers. Unlike desktop-based systems, Android already
provides strong isolation at the user interface level between
apps and we rely on that. Besides speeding up graphics,
another advantage of this is that it allows each guest virtual
machine to have a small memory footprint.
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Host Kernel
App
Process...
System
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...Isolation Container
System Call Result
...CorrespondingApp Proxy
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Fig. 2. High-level Anception Architecture: An app has a proxy in the
container bound to the app. System calls that need to be confined are redirected
to the proxy.
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Fig. 3. Anception Architecture: The Anception kernel module contains the
VM independent (left) and VM dependent portions (right)
The host kernel runs a normal Android stack. Applications
are bound to guest kernels representing the various containers.
The Anception container runs a software stack identical to the
host stack in most respects, except in its ability to render to
the display or process incoming touch input. That is, the guest
is an identical, headless version of the host software stack.
The identical portions include the kernel image and framework
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code that forms an Android runtime.
When an application is launched, a proxy process is
launched inside its container VM as well (see Figure 3). The
proxy process sees equivalent privileges, UIDs and directory
structures within the guest. The purpose of the proxy is to
execute forwarded system calls and return the results. When
the process dies, a request is sent to kill its proxy as well.
The architecture of Anception poses a design challenge
when it comes to managing memory. An app first launches in
the host. At the same time, a proxy process is created in the
container to which the app belongs. The app’s page tables and
user-space memory resides on the host. But, when it makes a
system call, somehow the parameters of that call must be made
available to the proxy since the proxy is supposed to execute
the call. As a concrete example, consider a system call to
open a file. The file has parameters such as the name of the
file to be opened. If the system call were executing locally,
the kernel can grab the parameters by reaching into app’s user-
space memory. In Anception’s case, the call is forwarded for
execution on a remote kernel. That guest kernel does not have
the ability to get to app’s user-space memory.
To address the above problem, Anception marshals all the
parameters of the call (in a similar fashion to the seccomp
sandbox [29]) and sends them to the proxy. For the above
call, the filename would be marshalled and sent to the proxy.
The proxy opens the file on its own kernel and gets a file
handle. The file handle is returned back to the host system.
Note that system resources, such as actual files and their
file handles, exist within the container. The app on the host
side gets a handle to a remote resource. That handle can be
used in subsequent read/write calls.
Marshalling occurs on write calls as well. Data that is
written to a file must be marshalled and sent to the proxy.
Fortunately, marshalling turned out to be straightforward for
most calls. Also marshalled data for most calls, except for a
few such as large file writes, consist of only small amount of
data. In a naive implementation, additional data copies would
be required – from host kernel to the proxy, from the proxy to
the container’s kernel, return of the result from the container’s
kernel to the proxy process, and then marshalling of the result
from the proxy process to the host kernel.
Fork/clone calls need to be handled carefully. It is not
sufficient to fork/clone an app’s process since its file handles
really reside with its proxy. Fortunately, the problem is easily
solved by also forking/cloning the proxy. So, in reality, each
process within an app is bound to its corresponding proxy.
Note that the container ID is always inherited whenever these
operations take place. A process cannot escape its container
through forking/cloning.
The execve call is handled in the following way. First of
all, nothing special needs to be done to the proxy on an exec
system call. The proxy continues to store the resource handles.
The host process executes the new code. If the binary being
executed is a system binary, it is simply executed on the host
since the host’s version is identical to the guest’s. If it is a user
generated binary, it is copied out from the guest to a special
execution cache that is not accessible to the untrusted app,
and executed from there. The reason for this is that we don’t
want the app to trick the system into copying an executable to
a restricted location. Expressing the policy this way is much
cleaner. Note that any newly executed binary will belong to
the same container as that of the parent.
Dangerous calls like insmod, rmmod, shutdown and
others relating to whole system management are denied to
applications because no user downloaded app should ever
invoke these. Android security model denies them as well.
Android allows a process to create shared memory segments
that can be mapped into memory of multiple processes.
Handling shared memory segments poses interesting design
options. The question is whether these should be created
within the host process or in the proxy. The problem is
that shared memory segments are often mapped into virtual
memory after creation and accessed from code (via the mmap
system all). Creating these shared memory segments in the
proxy would have required intercepting read/write memory
operations to the pages corresponding to shared memory
segments and transferring them to the proxy, which would
not be very efficient.
To address the above problem, mechanisms such as dis-
tributed shared memory [20], [17] could have been used, but
we chose to go with a simpler solution. We allow shared
memory segments to be created on the host. This may appear
to introduce a security risk if memory segments could be
shared between processes belonging to different containers.
Fortunately, that sharing can be easily prevented. In Android,
unlike Linux, memory segments cannot be shared by simply
knowing the segment name. Instead, Binder IPC calls must
be used to communicate memory segment handles. Anception
restricts such IPC calls to processes within the same container.
Thus, apps in different containers cannot share memory seg-
ments.
A. Management of Apps and Containers
All Android apps are started by a fork from the Zygote
process (which is like init in Linux). After the fork, Zygote
specializes the child into an application by setting its UID
and other parameters. We added code to notify the Anception
kernel module of this, and we replicate the same on the guest
by spawning a proxy, and specializing it. A userspace daemon
executes on the host and is responsible for the VM manage-
ment functions like startup and shutdown. It communicates
with the host module through a miscellaneous device node. It
is also responsible for binding an application to a container by
setting its vmid flag to a valid index in the redirection vector.
The vmid flag identifies the Container ID associated with the
app. A value of 0 for vmid identifies the trusted host. Higher
values identify the application’s container.
This vmid value is added as a one byte field in the process
descriptor in the host kernel so that a process’s container
can be identified by the system. This does limit Anception
to at most 256 containers, but that is likely to be more than
sufficient in practice.
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When an app runs, the Anception kernel module obtains
the task_struct of the process, and sets the virtualization
byte (vmid) to the appropriate index value. The vmid is
inherited by a process’s children. Forking/cloning does not
allow a process to escape its container. Also, since this process
descriptor is maintained on the host side, compromise of a root
service in the container does not allow the app to change its
vmid and escape the container.
B. Container Implementation
Containers run a special version of Android that contains
the stock Android system in a guest virtual machine. It has all
the core userspace system services found in a regular Android
system. The window manager and input manager are nullified
by making them talk to dummy devices. Thus, the capability
to render and process touch input is nullified. We refer to this
as headless Android. The point of running this in the guest
VM is to provide an alternate, mostly-identical system view
to an untrusted process.
Note that apps are not installed inside container images.
Thus, all container images are essentially identical, except for
state of the apps that are bound to the containers. Furthermore,
most of the runtime state of apps resides outside the container,
since the memory pages of apps mostly reside in the host
(except for much smaller state of the corresponding proxy that
runs in the container).
C. Proxies in an Anception Container
An app’s system call must be forwarded to its proxy (which
runs in a guest container). When a proxy is first started, it is
granted the same UID (among other parameters like umask).
When a redirected system call arrives at the proxy, we need
an efficient way of delegating its execution to the proxy. This
means we have to transfer execution from kernel context to
the proxy’s process context. One could have a message passing
mechanism that notifies a userspace process upon receipt of a
system call from the host, but this would require four costly
context switches to complete.
Anception uses a more efficient technique that eliminates
two of the context switches. We force the proxy process to
enter an interruptible sleeping wait in kernel space through
an ioctl on its container’s kernel module. When a redirected
system call comes in, we post this call to the container’s kernel,
which in turn wakes up the target proxy. After execution of
the system call is complete (without leaving the container
kernel), the proxy goes back to sleep, in kernel space. This
mechanism saves us two context switches over the other option
of having the proxy wait in userspace for a notification from
the container’s kernel that a system call is to be executed.
D. Efficient System Call Interception
To be able to redirect system calls, one must first intercept
a system call. We tried out several system call interception
mechanisms – in particular ptrace, kprobes, ftrace,
dtrace, and utrace – but found them to be too slow or
limiting. For example, Anception’s first prototype was built
using ptrace and User-Mode Linux [9]. In this experiment,
we bound untrusted processes by ptrace-ing them. However,
microbenchmark tests indicated overheads upwards of 60x
(primarily due to a high number of context switches). In
Android, all applications derive from Zygote. During a ptrace
session, reparenting occurs, and this may cause unintended
side-effects. Other mechanisms, primarily debugging or trac-
ing mechanisms, were also not efficient enough for our pur-
poses.
We decided to design our own system call interception
mechanism that was suited for transferring the call to a proxy
process in a different container efficiently. The system call
interception mechanism incurs an overhead of just a few
instructions on the host system.
The basic insight was that we could create a different system
call table per container and then provide an efficient way of
redirecting a system call to the appropriate table, based on the
app’s container ID (which is available in the vmid value in
the process descriptor as described in part B).
Figure 4 shows the details of a system call. When an
application process makes a system call (step 1), control is
transferred to the system call interrupt handler (step 2). At
that stage, we analyze a field in the process descriptor, named
vmid, that allows us to identify the container that is bound
to the process. A value of 0 indicates that the process runs
directly on the trusted host and no redirection should occur.
If vmid is greater than 0, its value specifies an index into
a redirection array. The redirection array is a set of base
addresses for various system call tables corresponding to the
various containers. The implementations of system calls will
serialize call arguments (step 3) and transfer them to the guest
kernel via the virtio transport (step 4). Once the call has
been executed by the host process’s proxy, the results are
returned either via virtio or via a hypercall (step 5). Finally,
the results are returned to the original process that initiated the
call.
Fig. 4. Anception Architectural Detail
System call interposition has been the topic of much re-
search in the past, several problems have been identified [10],
and solutions have been developed [11], [31]. Our system call
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interposition method follows several best practices outlined in
previous research [11], [31], [19], while avoiding the problems
encountered while building systems such as in [12], [15].
Some representative problems include time-of-check-time-of-
use (TOCTOU) attacks, and symlink races. The choice of
which syscalls to intercept has been influenced in part by the
REMUS system [5].
Our streamlined implementation of system call interception
adds a few assembly lines to the system call interrupt handler.
In practice, this is efficient. Furthermore, the amount of archi-
tectural state we save to intercept and redirect is negligible.
For details, see Table I. The minimal runtime overhead of the
system call interception is reported in Section VI-A.
entry method save restore
int 80 movl %eax, %ebx movl %ebx, %eax
sysenter
pushl %esi popl %esi
pushl %ebx popl %ebx
pushl %ecx popl %ecx
movl %eax, %ebx movl %ebx, %eax
TABLE I
ARCHITECTURAL STATE SAVES
V. SECURITY EVALUATION
We now analyze Anception’s ability to handle previously
existing attacks. All of the attacks discussed below would be
confined in a fully virtualized system. Anception potentially
presents a slightly larger attack surface for compromising the
trusted host than with full virtualization, since in Anception
there are some system calls that execute entirely in the host
environment. While the compromise of the host is outside of
our threat model, it is important to understand the limitations
of that assumption.
A. Vulnerability Study
We examined the past reported vulnerabilities on Android
in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) system
to determine how Anception compares with running untrusted
apps in full virtualization at protecting against the vulnerabili-
ties. The CVE system returned 362 CVE entries on searching
for the string “Android” from the past four years. Of these,
we found 62 CVEs that had sufficiently detailed information
for analysis, involved exploits of apps, and were deemed to be
protected by full virtualization. There were additional CVEs
(mostly involving Adobe Flash) that lacked sufficient detail on
the precise attack vector. It is likely that both full virtualization
and Anception would protect against those if the vulnerable
code was running as part of an untrusted app, but lack of detail
on the exploit prevented a scientific analysis.
Table II shows the details of the vulnerability study on
the 62 vulnerabilities that we deemed to be preventable when
running a malicious app under full virtualization. Of these, 47
involved apps that did not adequately protect files or interfaces
with other apps or the network, allowing an attacker to leak
sensitive information by gaining full or partial control of
the app. We judged those vulnerabilities to be preventable
in Anception if the apps were appropriately assigned to the
Vulnerability Type Prevented or Prevented or Prevented orConfined Confined by Full Confined
by Anception Virtualization by Cells
Application 47 47 47
System Services 7 7 7
Device Drivers 7 7 7
Kernel Core 1 1 1
Total 62 62 62
TABLE II
RESULTS OF MANUAL ANALYSIS OF CVE RECORDS.
Anception containers and appropriate policies for network
communication governed those containers.
Seven involved system services that could be manipulated
by malicious apps to escalate to root privileges or obtain
sensitive system information (see Section V-B).
Another seven were serious Linux device driver vulnerabil-
ities. These included four instances of poor bounds checking
on memory operations within graphics and diagnostics drivers.
A further two vulnerabilities were instances of improper deref-
erence and use of pointers to user space that were passed as
arguments to ioctl. In these six cases, the vulnerable driver
code is accessed by first opening the device file corresponding
to the vulnerable driver and then performing an ioctl system
call to send a request to the driver, which would contain the
exploit payload. In our experience, there would never be any
reason for an ordinary app running on Android to access
any device files directly other than binder and ashmem,
both of which are vital services intended to be used by all
applications, e.g., for sending intents and shared memory.
Anception redirects any open system calls for drivers other
than these two to the guest container, in turn confining the
vulnerability to the guest container.
On Cells, there is a higher risk that the above device driver
vulnerabilities will not be confined. There is only one kernel
in Cells shared by all the containers. If the device driver in
question is virtualized as well or disabled in a cell, then there
may be a possibility that the exploit could fail.
Finally, there was one instance of a driver file that provided
read and write access to physical memory and was configured
as world readable and writable by the vendor. Again, Ancep-
tion would prevent it since read/writes to such files would be
redirected to the container.
Finally, one vulnerability in the Linux kernel allowed an
attacker to compromise physical memory by triggering a null
dereference in code related to network socket operations.
Since Anception redirects these system calls, they would only
compromise the container that a malicious app was bound to.
Anception does present a different attack surface than full
virtualization and Cells. Since the display-related activity takes
place directly on the host, bugs in that could potentially be
used to exploit Android. We were unable to find such exploits.
B. Example Exploit Walkthrough – Gingerbreak
Anception prevents most rootkit attacks. To understand how,
we present a concrete example of the Gingerbreak exploit.
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Gingerbreak is a local privilege escalation based on a negative
integer array access in vold, the volume manager on Android.
It has been used by a number of malware applications [16]
as a method to gain superuser privileges and nullify the
Android security model. Below, we summarize the steps that
a malicious app with Gingerbreak takes and the actions that
occur when that app is running in an Anception container.
1) Gingerbreak starts out by making a copy of itself by
reading /proc/self/exe and writing to the mali-
cious app’s private directory. With Anception, the write
will be redirected to the app’s private directory, which
is an identically named and configured directory in the
app’s container. Thus, a copy of the exploit’s executable
will be made in the app’s container.
2) The exploit then proceeds to its information gathering
stage. The first step here is to find the vold dae-
mon by its process identifier. It does this by opening
/proc/net/netlink. With Anception, this open
system call will be redirected to the app’s container and
the exploit will read the container’s runtime informa-
tion of the netlink environment. We have an identical
environment in the container.
3) The exploit then searches procfs for
/system/bin/vold and makes a note of the
corresponding PID. As stated in Section IV, with
Anception, the system calls to find the pid will be
forwarded to the app’s container.
Note that now, the Gingerbreak exploit executing on the
host has obtained the PID of the vold executing inside
the container.
4) The exploit then proceeds to find the address of system
and strcmp inside /system/bin/libc.so. As ap-
plications execute on the host, and any useful application
will use libc, Anception simply allows opens and reads
to execute on the host for such system code libraries.
5) The exploit, in the next stage of information gathering,
attempts to find the Global Offset Table (GOT) start
address of vold. The Gingerbreak exploit does this
by opening the vold executable and using the ELF-
32 API to parse it. The exploit then looks for the last
piece of information to find the storage device that
vold manages. System files are involved in the reading
process and as per our rules, we let them go through on
the host itself since these files are read-only.
Coming to the actual privilege escalation, Gingerbreak
needs to find the negative index value to send to vold so
as to achieve code execution. It uses a brute force approach
by trying values in a range and then scanning the logcat crash
logs for failed attempts. The exploit creates its own logcat log
file (which is redirected and created in the app’s container),
kills logcat (which is mirrored in the app’s container as well),
and then restarts it by specifying its own file as the log
file (also restarted in the app’s container). Note that as per
Anception’s rules, when a fork/exec occurs, we simply let the
fork happen on the host, but the new process is bound to the
app’s container; the sandbox is extended to the forked process.
Since the new logcat is bound to app’s container, it sends its
output to a file that only exists in that container.
Once an index has been calculated, Gingerbreak forms a
netlink message and uses socket calls to talk with the vold
process. With Anception, Gingerbreak sends shellcode with
the negative index to vold inside the container. This causes
vold to execute the exploit binary that was copied into the
container. The exploit always checks on execution whether its
uid is 0. Since vold started it the second time in the container,
the root check succeeds and the exploit has succeeded inside
the container VM. As the container is isolated via system
virtualization, the host remains protected.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Anception’s design decision is to launch the applications
from the host rather than within the container and not direct
graphics operations. To verify that it is the right design choice
for Android, we conducted a small experiment to measure the
relative frequency of UI updates and touch events as compared
to other class of operations. We ran five regular applications
available on almost every phone - Email, Web Browser, Music,
MMS, Default Game. As we see in Table III, over 92% of the
system calls made are UI-related. A similar study measuring
categories of system calls was conducted by ProfileDroid [32]
as well. The results from both studies serve to confirm our
hypothesis.
Service Requested Total Count Percent
android.accounts 2 0.00%
android.app 1769 2.96%
android.content 1611 2.69%
android.media 16 0.03%
android.net 4 0.01%
android.os 122 0.20%
android.ui 48646 81.35%
android.utils 919 1.54%
android.view 2004 3.35%
com.android.internal.telephony 82 0.14%
com.android.internal.view 4619 7.72%
ImountService 1 0.00%
TABLE III
COUNTS OF VARIOUS BINDER IPC IOCTLS ISSUED TO ANDROID
SERVICES. NOTE THAT UI DOMINATES OTHER TYPES OF REQUESTS.
Next, we run a microbenchmark to analyze the overhead of
the VM-independent system call interception framework. We
run two popular Android macrobenchmarks to analyze whole
system performance and one application level benchmark to
analyze the impact on end users. The macrobenchmarks are
used so that we can measure the performance for interactive
workloads that are the most common for smartphones. We also
report on the memory consumption of the guest VMs.
All the benchmarks are run on an Asus EEEPC ET1602
equipped with an Intel Atom x86 processor, 1GB of RAM
and 160GB of internal flash memory. The EEEPC runs An-
droid x86 version 2.3.7 with Linux kernel version 2.6.39. We
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configured the guest VM with 64MB of main memory that
ran our headless Android port.
A. Microbenchmarks
We run a microbenchmark to measure the latency of per-
forming 3 common system calls with the Anception Syscall
Interception Method (ASIM) activated. We measure the time
for a null-redirection, which is intercepting a syscall and
redirecting it to the real system call handler. The benchmark
executes the syscalls 10,000 times and uses the x86 cycle
counter for timing. Trial runs are executed by the benchmark to
warm up the caches. The results for the ASIM are summarized
in Table IV. The write, read calls are executed on files.
syscall Native (µs) Anception (µs)
getpid 0.57 0.57
write (32 bytes) 17.7 17.8
read (32 bytes) 3.3 3.4
TABLE IV
ASIM LATENCY
As we can see in the table, the ASIM adds negligible
overhead and is very efficient. The next microbenchmark
measures the round-trip time for a system call when redirected
to an active guest VM. The results are summarized in Table
V.
syscall Native (µs) Anception (µs)
write (16 bytes) 24.9 206.9
read (16 bytes) 3.4 203.2
write (32 bytes) 17.7 196.6
read (32 bytes) 3.3 212.7
TABLE V
FULL REDIRECTION ROUND TRIP TIME
The increase in latency is caused due to two VM switches
(host→ guest, guest→ host) and process context switches. As
context switch times go down due to improvements in hyper-
visor technology, we expect to see reductions in the latency.
However, these numbers do not adversely affect performance
at a macro level, which is what we report on next.
B. Macrobenchmarks
We run three popular Android macrobenchmarks – Pass-
Mark [24], AnTuTu [2] and SunSpider [28]. These benchmarks
are designed to test 2D and 3D graphics performance, Disk
I/O, Memory I/O and CPU (Java, Native) performance. They
report a weighted total score, and individual scores. Running
2D/3D benchmarks enables us to analyze the overheads caused
by our ioctl handling logic. It should not cause a large
overhead because graphics related ioctls form a large chunk
of the system calls executed by applications (Table III).
The PassMark benchmark reports details of the tests con-
ducted. Figure 5 shows us that Anception incurs negligible
overhead for a range of 2D and 3D graphics tests. They also
show no noticeable change. Overhead of 3.88% is incurred
on 2D tests and 2.64% on 3D tests. In terms of CPU and
Memory I/O, as reported by PassMark, Anception incurs
0.43% overhead on memory operations and 2.3% overhead on
CPU operations. This slight increase is due to the guest VM
running Headless Android that puts additional scheduling and
memory pressure on the host. However, due to our architecture
of handling UI operations on the host, the impact of this VM
is negligible.
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Fig. 5. PassMark Benchmark
On the AnTuTu Benchmark, Anception’s score was 3.6%
less than native, with a 0.4% overhead on the 2D tests and
1.3% overhead on the 3D tests. To get an idea of Ancep-
tion’s performance with interactive and application oriented
workloads, we run the SunSpider [28] Benchmark. At a
macro level, from Figure 6, we observe that Anception closely
follows the performance of native execution with a 1.2%
maximum overhead among all tests. This benchmark also
shows our ability to run unmodified Android applications on
Anception. The reason for the modest overheads is the ioctl
identification code wherein we determine whether a particular
IPC operation is related to graphics and input operations.
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C. Memory overhead
Finally, we quantify the memory (RAM) savings earned
by using a headless version of Android. To measure this,
we read the /proc/meminfo file on a stock Android 2.3.7
system, and we read the meminfo file on a headless instance.
These readings were taken when the systems were just booted
up and just the bare essentials were running. For a stock
Android system, the number of active bytes of memory is
99.11 MB. On the headless version, it is 14.87 MB, or
15% of stock Android. This is much smaller compared to
40% of stock Android that is needed by Cells to start a
guest VM. Moreover, we have not applied optimizations like
Kernel Samepage Merging (KSM) that Cells has applied to
its implementation. We expect to see further reductions with
KSM in place. The reason for the decrease is again due
to Anception’s architecture. By running a Headless Android
instance in the guest VM, the memory used up by Display
Managers and Input Managers is freed up, allowing us to run
smaller sized (in terms of RAM) VMs. However, during all our
experiments, we started the guest VMs with 64MB of main
memory, although we could have started them with as low as
44MB of memory. We did not do this as we didn’t want to
adjust the Android low memory killer parameters.
D. Power Measurements
Smartphones are resource constrained devices and usually
have limited battery power. In order to ensure that the effect
on energy consumption due to Anception is not significant, we
conducted several experiments on the PassMark and SunSpider
benchmarks to quantify the overhead. We used a Watts Up?
.Net power meter for our measurements on power and energy
consumption. Using the MonkeyRunner feature provided by
the Android platform, we built automated tests to run the
benchmarks for an hour each, both with and without Anception
enabled. In order to simulate the actual execution of an
application, the benchmark was exited using the back button
after every run. For the PassMark benchmark, we observed
that the energy consumption was 20.8 Watt hours without
binding it to Anception and the consumption went up to 21.3
Watt hours upon binding, giving an overhead of 2.4%. For the
SunSpider benchmark, energy consumption without Anception
was 34 Watt hours and on binding the consumption went up
to 35.3 Watt hours indicating an increase of 3.82%.
VII. LIMITATIONS
As Anception is a research prototype, we acknowledge a
few limitations of the system.
As we described in Section IV, intent requests to all Android
system services, except for the touch display, are directed
to the container. If an app sends a request to the Location
Manager to get the GPS readings, the IPC request will go to
the guest and then be delivered to the Location Manager in
the container. That Location Manager will talk to a virtual
GPS device. Then, it is a matter of policy whether the virtual
device should be permitted to talk to the real device on the
host via a narrow interface. Our research prototype has not
implemented these mappings from virtual devices to physical
devices, but the technology to do that is well understood. Most
virtual machines, such as VMware, have that capability.
The Linux kernel allows certain system calls to be im-
plemented by drivers. Examples include the ioctl or VFS
system calls (read, write). Since these are relatively new
implementations, they can be buggy. As Anception does not
redirect all system calls all the time, it can happen that some
system calls that go to such buggy drivers are executed on the
host. In such cases, Anception is unable to provide sufficient
isolation so as to protect the integrity of the host. However, this
is an area of current research and we could build upon other
solutions in the literature designed to tolerate buggy drivers
[23].
UI system calls and related non-redirected system calls
could themselves contain bugs. As such calls are always
executed on the host, there is a small chance that they could be
exploited by malicious apps. However, given that such calls are
heavily used, it is likely that most errors have been corrected.
Anception only supports memory-mapped file I/O partially.
If a file is in the read-only part of the file system (e.g., /system
on Android), those can be memory-mapped since the I/O
operations on those are directed to the host. Memory-mapping
in the writeable portion of the filesystem is not supported.
Those files reside in the container. This is not a fundamental
architecture limitation. NFS-mounted files can be memory-
mapped. A possible strategy for implementing that would be
to provide an NFS-style access for the host to a container’s
filesystem.
Anception does not currently use kernel same page merging
optimizations [18]. The results from the Cells [1] paper show
that those optimizations can significantly reduce the memory
requirements for multiple containers. We expect containers to
have a high degree of overlap in pages since, except for the
small proxies to hold system-relevant state, the memory pages
of an application reside on the host.
Anception currently only supports the simple policy that
only apps having the same UID are assigned the same con-
tainer. It would be interesting to explore other types of policies.
For example, all work-related apps could be assigned to belong
to one container and personal apps belong to another container.
In that case, Anception can be used as a platform to support
multiple virtual phones, as in Cells [1].
VIII. RELATED WORK
We categorize the related research into several classes and
draw on ideas and techniques from several of them.
A. OS Virtualization
Systems based on paravirtualization such as VMware [3]
Xen [14] as well as Cells [1] can provide a a full virtual
container for the entire operating system. Cells, in particular,
is a good solution for virtualization on Android if the goal
is to support multiple virtual phones. It uses a single shared
kernel. The goal of Anception is to provide application-
level encapsulation. It may be possible to provide Cells-based
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Anception where, instead of using lguest, cells are used to pro-
vide containers. This would require a substantial redesign as,
currently, each cell provides a full Android environment with
its own set of apps. Conversely, it may be possible to provide
Cells-like virtual phones using Anception as a platform. It will
require significant changes to Anception’s handling of IPCs
(cross-container IPCs will need to be forbidden) and apps will
need to be allowed to be associated with multiple containers.
The recent ExpressOS system [21] by Mai et al is an OS
built in a type-safe language. The aim is to build a small ver-
ifiable OS kernel that is able to run apps with high assurance
of the services provided to them. ExpressOS provides a secure
storage service (among others) that guarantees data written to
disk is not tampered with or disclosed to an untrusted Android
runtime. The difference with Anception is that ExpressOS
does not strengthen the isolation between trusted and untrusted
apps. If an application is benign but buggy, ExpressOS does
not provide protection against exploitation by other apps.
ExpressOS is complementary to Anception in addressing a
different threat model.
VirtuOS [23] by Nikolaev and Back is a modified Linux
environment that isolates device drivers in virtual machine
containers, which run in parallel to improve performance on
multicore environments. Anception does not address device
driver security. VirtuOS is complementary to Anception in
addressing a different threat model.
Anception builds on techniques from several systems. The
Pods system [19] uses system call interposition as the mech-
anism for virtualizing a process’s view of the OS. Linux
Containers is another mechanism being integrated into the
Linux kernel, which will allow a user to establish isolated
containers via a tool called LXC. Linux Containers use a
namespace mechanism to isolate and virtualize resources di-
rectly from within the kernel. The interposition mechanisms
of Pods and Linux Containers has similarities to that used in
Anception. Both Pods and Linux Containers are full solutions
that handle virtualization of an entire guest system. In this way,
they are interchangeable with lguest in our implementation of
Anception, but do not include any policy for deciding which
system calls are worth keeping on the host for performance
reasons. Because of this, we view them as complementary
tools to our work.
Overshadow [8] provides mechanisms for applications to
protect their state from compromised kernels.
B. App Sandboxing
Providing strong isolation on Android is mostly centered
around policy based approaches. TrustDroid [6] monitors IPC
channels, network and filesystem accesses through extensive
modifications to the Android framework and prevents apps
in different trust domains from talking to each other. Unlike
Anception, an untrusted app in TrustDroid executes entirely
on the host kernel, as there is only one kernel. That poten-
tially makes TrustDroid vulnerable to native code exploits via
system calls that would be forwarded to the guest kernel in
Anception but are executed on the host kernel in TrustDroid.
AppFence [13] prevents access to a user’s private data
(e.g., contacts data) by providing false or pre-recorded data to
untrusted apps, based on policy. Aurasium [33] inserts inline
reference monitors in untrusted applications and monitors their
interactions through the system calls made. In some cases, it
rewrites system call arguments and return values (at the libc
level) to enforce certain types of policies.
Janus [12] is a user-level tool that allows users to sandbox
applications and implement a policy that determines which
system calls they are allowed to execute. If a particular system
call invocation is not expressly permitted by the user-specified
policy, it is discarded and returns an error to the calling
process. Anception is much more flexible than this, in that
it provides an isolated environment in which risky calls can
execute safely, rather than simply denying them.
Wine Windows Emulator on Linux and Drawbridge for
Windows [25] provide a linkable user-space OS library that
encapsulates an entire Windows OS to which executables can
link to. Part of the goal of these is to allow applications to
be portable across different versions of Windows (they can be
distributed bundled with the OS library). But, another potential
use of Drawbridge, in particular, is to sandbox individual
applications. There are some similarities in that Anception
also allows individual applications to be sandboxed but there
are also some differences in both design and philosophy.
Drawbridge uses Windows Remote Desktop to allow encap-
sulated apps to share a common display. Anception’s apps
have direct access to the Android display, which, by design,
should have lower latency and be more efficient on mobile
devices, especially for gaming apps that are highly interactive.
Anception allows multiple applications to be assigned to
a common sandbox, i.e., Anception containers. Drawbridge
applications cannot share system state.
C. File System Isolation
Android recently incorporated a multiuser feature that helps
in setting up multiple user accounts and sharing of a single de-
vice. Each user is assigned a unique user ID and corresponding
directory on the filesystem (/data/users/ID). When the
device switches to a user, symbolic links are set up from an
app’s directory (/data/data/APP.PKG) to the private user
directory. This enables backwards compatibility and makes a
profile switch efficient, but the overall design has drawbacks.
If an owner wants to share an app, he must first create a
secondary profile, switch profiles and reinstall the app into
the new profile. If the owner uses his own Google account,
various settings can be imported into the other profile, causing
privacy leaks. Direct sharing from the primary user profile is
not possible, although there are community built apps that
enable such sharing. These have the disadvantage of sharing
all private data from the owner’s profile with the secondary
profile.
D. Information Flow Techniques
Moses [27] is a system that provides isolation among apps
in different trust domains. The main disadvantage of Moses
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is that it requires heavyweight taint tracking at run-time to
detect and prevent undesirable information flows. Moses uses
filesystem virtualization (namespaces) to provide a different
data directory to an app. This allows an app to maintain
different profiles by switching filesystem namespaces. This
supports sharing of apps easily but does not provide a secure
and isolated execution environment for untrusted apps.
IX. CONCLUSION
Current virtualization solutions, although useful, fall short
of user expectations. Anception proposes a headless virtualiza-
tion model that achieves a balance between isolation strength,
user experience, and system performance while protecting a
user’s internal (on-device) and external (online) data. Through
a combination of system call redirection and system virtual-
ization, Anception provides the technology to run a subset
of an app in an isolated, virtual container while maintaining
correctness of execution. An exhaustive evaluation of Ancep-
tion in terms of security guarantees and system performance
revealed overheads of up to 3.88% on various 2D and 3D
benchmarks and up to 3.82% additional power usage, as well
as comparable isolation guarantees to existing virtualization
mechanisms, showing that Anception is indeed a practical
system. As future work, we aim to investigate other forms of
system virtualization like namespaces, while keeping kernel
changes modest and maintaining security guarantees.
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